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COMPARATIVE JURISDICTION IN
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT:
WILL THE PROPOSED HAGUE JUDGMENTS
CONVENTION BE STALLED?
Linda Silberman*
INTRODUCTION
My perspective for this Symposium on American Civil Justice in a
Global Context focuses on the differences between jurisdictional re-
gimes in the United States and Europe.' Those differences have been
highlighted most recently through the lens of the negotiations at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law in an attempt to ar-
rive at a worldwide convention on international jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments. While my Article compares contrasting
approaches of the United States and Europe to judicial jurisdiction,
the tensions about the proper scope of jurisdictional rules that came to
a head in the Hague negotiations are really reflective of other aspects
of American procedure that are discussed in some of the other articles
in this Symposium. 2 That is to say, much of the attack on American-
style judicial jurisdiction is not really about jurisdiction at all, but
* Martin Lipton Professor of Law. New York University School of Law: B.A. 1965. Univer-
sity of Michigan: J.D. 1968. University of Michigan Law School. © 2002, Linda Silberman.
This article reflects the collaborations and co-authorships of related papers with my colleague,
Andreas Lowenfeld. and as always. I am grateful for his guidance and his help.
1. My primary focus is on the European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the Brussels and Lugano Conventions), along with the
recent modification of the Brussels Convention in the Council of the European Union Regula-
tion on Jurisdiction and Judgments (Brussels Regulation). The jurisdictional provisions in these
Community arrangements do not necessarily track domestic jurisdictional rules of individual
Member States. and in many cases, certain national jurisdictional rules of Member States are
prohibited in the context of claims against domiciliaries of Member States. Nonetheless, the
jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and the Brussels (EU) Regula-
tion offer a starting point for my comparison. It is worth noting that civil law countries outside
of Europe have jurisdictional regimes not dissimilar to the rules adopted in Brussels/Lugano.
Finally. where appropriate, I include references to domestic jurisdictional rules in individual
countries.
2. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin. Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAIL L.
REV. 299 (2003) (comparing access to information before trial in U.S. and other systems): Ed-
ward F. Sherman, Emerging Mechanisms for Aggregation and Group Litigation In Foreign Legal
Systeris: Variations and Alternatives to Class Actions, 52 DEPAuL L. REV. 401 (2003) (discussing
U.S. class action as compared with alternative models for group litigation in other countries)
Michael Zander. Will the Revolution in the Funding of Civil Litigation in England Eventually
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about unhappiness with other aspects of civil litigation in the United
States-juries, discovery, class actions, contingent fees, and often sub-
stantive American law, which is perceived as pro-plaintiff and selected
under similar pro-plaintiff choice of law rules in U.S. courts. In the
context of transnational litigation, of course, implementation of those
unattractive (from the European perspective) features of American
civil justice are achieved through assertion of judicial jurisdiction in
U.S. courts, often over foreign country defendants. In the context of
an initiative for a worldwide judgments convention, the Europeans
perceived a "corrective mechanism" if they could obtain an interna-
tional consensus on rules for asserting judicial jurisdiction, and
thereby set limits on jurisdiction over foreign defendants by U.S.
courts.
II. Two CENTS' WORTH OF BACKGROUND: THE HAGUE
JUDGMENTS PROJECT AND THE ROLE
OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
Although the initiative for a multilateral treaty dealing with recog-
nition of judgments was that of the United States, 3 the United States
has expressed unhappiness with the results of those negotiations, cul-
minating in the June 2001 Draft.4 Indeed, the negotiators recognized
that they had arrived at a stalemate with respect to the 1999 and 2001
Drafts;5 and at the General Affairs and Policy Session at the Hague in
Lead to Contingency Fees?, 52 DFPAUL L. REV. 259 (2003) (comparing English conditional fees
and American contingency fees).
3. See generally Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7 (1998); Arthur T. von Mehren. Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994). The intellectual role of Professor Arthur von Mehren in
this effort is discussed in Peter Nygh, Arthur's Baby: The Hague Negotiations For A World-Wide
Judgments Convention, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD 151-52 (James A.R.
Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds.. Transnational Pub., Inc. 2002).
4. See Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law.
U.S. Dept. of State, to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law (Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Kovar Letter] (commenting
on the Oct. 30, 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention); Testimony of Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant
Legal Adviser for Private International Law. U.S. Dept. of State, Before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representa-
tives, available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/kova0629.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2002). The
most recent Convention Draft is that of June 6-20, 2001. See Summary of the Outcome of the
Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001. avail-
able at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm200ldraft-e.doc (last visited Oct. 7, 2002) [hereinafter June
2001 Draft].
5. See Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Some Re-
flections on the Present State of Negotiations on the Judgments Project in the Context of the Future
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April 2002, an effort was undertaken to determine if a more modest
convention framework-that looked to more limited jurisdictional
provisions such as the "home" of commercial defendants and the use
of choice of forum clauses 6 as a basis for a jurisdiction/recognition
convention-would be possible.7
The United States is not a party to any bilateral judgments conven-
tion; enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad is often resisted, 8 whereas
the United States is extremely liberal in enforcing the judgments of
other countries. Thus, the United States had substantial interest in
negotiating a worldwide convention that would make a broad range of
U.S. judgments enforceable in other countries. 9 The Europeans had
greater reservations. As among the members of the European Union
(EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions' already regulated both the exercise of judi-
cial jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
At the same time, judgments from EU and EFTA countries were lib-
Work Programme of the Conference, Preliminary Doc. No. 16 (Feb. 2002), available at ftp://ftp.
hcch.net/doc/gen-pdl6e.doc (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
6. In preparation for the April 2002 meeting. the Permanent Bureau compiled material on
choice of court clauses in international litigation. See Avril D. Haines. Choice of Court Agree-
ments in International Litigation: Their Use and Legal Problems To Which The)
, 
Give Rise In The
Context of the Interim Text, Preliminarv Doc. No. 18 (Feb. 2002), available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/
doc/gen-pdl8e.doc (last visited Oct. 7. 2002).
7. See Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference Commission I on General Affairs & Pol-
icy Held on 22-24 April, 2002. at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/genaff.html (last visited Oct.
14. 2002).
8. For a recent survey on the treatment of U.S. judgments in other countries, see Committee
on Foreign and Comparative Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Survey on
Foreign Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments (July 2001), available at http://brownwelsh.com/
Archive/A BCNYStudyEnforcingJudgments.pdf (last visited Oct. 7. 2002).
9. See Linda Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved?: A Perspective from the
United States, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISIDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE
HAGtii 159-89 (John J. Barcelo Ill & Kevin Clermont eds.. 2002) [hereinafter Silberman, Can
the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved?]. Other countries outside of the EU and EFTA also had
an interest in more liberal recognition and enforcement of their judgments. For an excellent
overview of recognition and enforcement practice outside of the Brussels and Lugano Conven-
tions, see Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner. General Report. in THE REcOGNITION ANi)
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSEIS ANi) LUGANO CONVEN-
"iONS 1-45 (Kluwer Law International 2000).
10. The Brussels Convention, 199) O.J. (C 189) 2. was replaced by EU Regulation 44/2001.
O.J. 2001 (L 12)1. effective March 1. 2002 [hereinafter Brussels Regulation]. The use of a "regu-
lation" rather than a revision of the Brussels Convention by a new treaty was intended to avoid
the need of individual Member States to go through the ratification process with submission of
the revised text to their respective parliaments. For an overview of the substantive changes
made by the new Regulation, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD. INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARUIRAION 472-74 (2d ed. 2002). For more on the new Brussels Regulation. see Peter E.
Herzog. Rules on the International Recognition of Judgments (And On International Jurisdiction)
By Enactienits Of An International Organization: European Community Regulations 1347/2000
And 44/2001. in LAW AND JUSICE IN A MULISTATE WORLD. supra note 3. at 83-105.
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erally enforced in the United States without benefit of a treaty and
generally without any requirement of reciprocity. 1 Thus, one of the
incentives for the EU and EFTA countries (as well as other countries)
to enter into a recognition/enforcement convention with the United
States was to obtain from the United States, in exchange for broader
enforcement, some restrictions on perceived excesses with respect to
U.S. assertions of jurisdiction.
However, it is interesting to note that in many respects U.S. asser-
tions of judicial jurisdiction are actually narrower than those in many
civil law countries and even other common law countries.12 For exam-
ple, civil law countries have, in some circumstances, asserted jurisdic-
tion based on the nationality of the plaintiff1 3 and have provisions for
unlimited jurisdiction based on property in their state. 14 Jurisdictional
bases such as these have been identified as "exorbitant" under the
Brussels/Lugano regimes and may not be exercised as against domicil-
iaries of those countries. 15 Nonetheless, assertions of jurisdiction on
11. Under existing U.S. law, enforcement of foreign judgments is a matter of state rather than
federal law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 481 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judg-
ments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263 (2002), adopted by thirty-one states and territories, re-
flects the practice of recognition and enforcement more generally: the Act itself does not contain
any requirement of reciprocity, although a number of states, including several that have adopted
the Uniform Act, do make lack of reciprocity a defense to enforcement. For a more extensive
discussion of enforcement of foreign country judgments in the United States, see Linda J. Silber-
man & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALl: Herein of Foreign Country
Judgments, an International Treaty and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635-38, 643-44 (2000)
[hereinafter Silberman & Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge]: Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Sta-
tus of American Law in the Hague Judgments Convention Project. 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1305-07
(1998).
12. See generally Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American
Cooperation With Those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 9, 19-24 (1996).
13. C. civ. art. 14 (Fr.). An alien, even if not residing in France, may be summoned before the
French courts for the fulfillment of obligations contracted by him in France towards a French
person; he may be summoned before the courts in France for obligations contracted by him in a
foreign country towards French persons. Id., translated in RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL..
COMPARATIVE LAW (6th ed., Foundation Press 1998).
For an extensive analysis of the case law under Article 14, see Henry P. deVries & Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions - A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IOWA L.
REV. 306, 316-30 (1959).
14. See Art. 23 ZPO. More recently, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) seems
to have required that jurisdiction under Article 23 could be justified only if the cause of action
had some additional link to the forum. Dec. of July 2, 1991. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
, 
1 Deut-
sches Wirtschaftsrecht [DWiR] 245 (No. 6 1991), discussed in LOWENFELD, supra note 10, at 254.
15. See generally Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27. 1968, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2, art. 3 (consolidated) [hereinafter Brus-
sels Convention].
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these grounds are appropriate with respect to defendants from other
countries, including U.S. defendants.' 6
Another example can be found in domestic English rules of jurisdic-
tion, which in certain provisions offer a broader jurisdictional reach
than specific-act statutes of states in the United States.1 7 For example,
jurisdiction in England is permitted when the contract is governed by
English law' 8 or when the English court has jurisdiction over one de-
fendant and the party outside the jurisdiction is a necessary or proper
party.' 9 Indeed, a number of the jurisdictional rules of Brussels/
Lugano, such as the provisions for jurisdiction over multiple parties 201
and over third-party defendants, 2' as well as several of the English
rules noted above, might well run afoul of constitutional restrictions in
the United States. 22 Thus, the perception outside the United States of
the "jurisdictional excessiveness" of U.S. courts is highly exaggerated.
But there is one major area where the assertion of jurisdiction by
courts in the United States is different and broader than that of most
civil law countries-and that is the concept of general "doing busi-
ness" jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of defen-
dant's substantial activity, even when the claim is unrelated to those
activities. 23 It is often that basis of jurisdiction that supports some of
16. Id. at art. 4.
17. See Linda J. Silberman. Judicial Jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws Course: Adding a
Comparative Dimension, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'i L. 389 (1995) [hereinafter Silberman, Com-
parative Dimension].
18. United Kingdom: The Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules (2000). SI 2000/221 No.
6.20(5)(c) [hereinafter UK Rules 20001.
19. Id. at 6.20(3).
20. The Brussels Convention, Article 6(1) provides for jurisdiction over a person domiciled in
a Member State "where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where
any one of them is domiciled.- Brussels Convention, supra note 15, at art. 6(1). The new Brus-
sels Regulation (art. 6(1)) is somewhat more restrictive, adding the following proviso: "provided
the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to
avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings." Brussels Regu-
lation, supra note 10. at art. 6(l).
21. Brussels Convention, supra note 15, at art. 6(2): Brussels Regulation, supra note 10. at art.
6(2).
22. The absence of any nexus between the additional party defendant and the forum would
appear to make such an exercise of jurisdiction unconstitutional under American due process
standards. See infra text accompanying notes 58-65.
23. For recent discussions of the general "doing business" jurisdiction. see Patrick J. Borchers.
The Problem with GeneralJurisdiction. 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119 (suggesting that general juris-
diction may be necessary to fill in gaps in specific jurisdiction created by constitutional restric-
tions on specific jurisdiction); Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction,
2001 U. CHI. LEOAi F. 141 (tracing the origins of general "doing business" jurisdiction and
urging some adjustments to its scope): Mary Twitchell. Why We Keep Doing Business with Do-
ing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (surveying recent cases on general jurisdic-
tion and recommeding certain limitations when foreign country defendants are involved).
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the recent human rights cases in U.S. courts against foreign corpora-
tions and banks24-litigation that is perceived by other countries as
particularly egregious.2 5
Therefore, it was not surprising that from its inception, the pro-
posed Hague Convention was directed to both the regulation of judi-
cial jurisdiction and the recognition/enforcement of judgments.
Initially, the Europeans were committed to a pure double convention
in the manner of Brussels/Lugano-that is, direct jurisdiction that
would fall into one of two categories, mandated or prohibited-and
rules of recognition and enforcement to follow accordingly. 26 Such a
structure proved too restrictive and inflexible for the large number of
countries that were to be potential parties to the proposed worldwide
Hague Convention; reaching consensus on what belonged in the re-
spective areas of required and prohibited jurisdiction was almost im-
possible given the variety of different legal systems and jurisdictional
regimes that the Convention had to accommodate. Thus, after some
initial resistance in early drafts, both the October 1999 Preliminary
Draft 27 and the latest June 2001 Draft28 accept, if rather grudgingly,
the idea of a "mixed convention," that is a convention that has not
only required and prohibited bases of jurisdiction but also a category
of "permitted" jurisdiction.2 9 Within this "third" or gray zone of juris-
24. See, e.g.. In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 179
(S.D.N.Y. 2000): In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig.. 198 F.R.D. 429
(D.N.J. 2000): Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). See generally
Michael J. Bazyler. Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34
U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000): Beth Stephens. The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations
and Human Rights. 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45. 82-90 (2002): Burt Neuborne. Preliminary Re-
flections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts. 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795
(2002).
25. See Peter F. Schlosser. Bases of Jurisdiction in A New Double Convention on Jurisdiction
and Recognition of Foreign Judgments, in THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENiS A-13-27 (Andreas Lowenfeld & Linda Silberman eds., Juris Publ'g 2001) [hereinaf-
ter NYU Conference].
26. Indeed, both the September 1998 and November 1998 Preliminary Drafts of the Proposed
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, Working Document 144, adopted the Brus-
sels model of required and prohibited categories of jurisdiction. See generally NYU Conference,
supra note 25, at C-1-17. C-39-63.
27. See Preliminary Draft of Oct. 30. 1999. available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/
draft36e.html (last visited Nov. 11. 2002) [hereinafter Oct. 1999 Draft].
28. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4.
29. See generally Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar. Report of the Special Commission on Interna-
tional Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2000), available at
ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgmpdl 1.doc (last visited Oct. 7. 2002) [hereinafter Nygh & Pocar, Report
of the Special Commission]. For more on the advantages of a mixed convention, see Arthur T.
vonMehren. Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effect of Foreign Judg-
ments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
191. 196-200 (2001).
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diction, a court may exercise jurisdiction when authorized by national
law (so long as it does not appear on the prohibited list of exorbitant
bases of jurisdiction). 30 Judgments rendered on such a basis are not
necessarily entitled to recognition or enforcement by other countries;
recognition and enforcement are left to the national law of the enforc-
ing country.
One continuing problem in the negotiations at the Hague was
reaching a consensus on jurisdictional grounds appropriate for the
"gray area." The gray areas are not easy to find, due partially to the
two hundred footnotes and close to one hundred passages in square
brackets that appear in the June 2001 Draft. For example, although
Article 7, entitled "Contracts Concluded by Consumers," appears to
be a case of required jurisdiction and enforcement, that Article has
fifteen passages in brackets, three alternatives (one of which has two
variants), and is accompanied by twenty footnotes. One of the major
disagreements involves choice of court clauses in consumer contracts
and dissatisfaction with the provision in the October 1999 Draft3' that
limits (in an action against a consumer) derogation away from the
consumer's habitual residence to post-dispute agreements. One of the
alternatives in the June 2001 Draft would permit broader jurisdiction
in consumer cases when there is a pre-dispute choice of court clause in
consumer cases, 32 but then would allow Contracting States to make
declarations that they will not recognize or enforce, or will specify
conditions under which they will recognize or enforce, a judgment
based on such jurisdiction.3 3 A second alternative would give broader
effect to choice of court clauses in consumer cases through declara-
tions to that effect by Contracting States.3 4 A similar structure is pro-
posed-in a footnote and attached Annex-when the judgment is
30. Article 17 in the June 2001 Draft provides: "[Subject to certain exceptions]. the Conven-
tion does not prevent the application by Contracting States of rules of jurisdiction under national
law. provided that this is not prohibited under Article 18 [The Prohibited Grounds of Jurisdic-
tion]." June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 17.
31. See Oct. 1999 Draft. supra note 27. at art. 7(3), which provides:
The parties to a contract within the meaning of paragraph 1 may. by an agreement
which conforms with the requirements of Article 4. make a choice of court-
a) if such agreement is entered into after the dispute has arisen, or
b) to the extent only that it allows the consumer to bring proceedings in another
court.
Id.
32. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4. at art. 7. Alternative A(7).
33. See id. at art. 25. bis (which appears as an insert in art. 7, Alternative A, after (7)).
34. See id. at art. 7. Alternative B, Variant I & Variant 2.
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derived from an action at the habitual residence of the employee
based on an individual contract of employment.3 5
The proposed Hague Convention's basic jurisdictional principle in
consumer and individual employment cases-habitual residence of
the plaintiff-is somewhat alien to the American tradition. To the ex-
tent the rule does not require a nexus with the defendant, it may well
be regarded as violating due process limitations on the exercise of ju-
risdiction in courts of the United States. The consumer provision now
includes the qualification that the claim must be related to trade or
professional activities that the defendant has engaged in or directed to
that State, and the consumer must have taken steps necessary for the
conclusion of the contract in that State,3 6 thus bringing the provision
closer in line with U.S. constitutional norms. Moreover, the flexibility
reflected in the various alternatives with respect to accommodating
those States that accept pre-dispute choice of court clauses in con-
sumer cases represents another bow in the direction of the United
States. 37
Before turning to a more extensive discussion of some of the differ-
ences between the American and European approaches to jurisdic-
tion, several other basic features of the proposed Hague Convention
are worthy of examination. Unlike the Brussels Convention/Regula-
tion, the proposed Hague treaty would not have a final authority, such
as the European Court of Justice, to oversee its operation.3 8 Without
a supranational authority to superintend assertions of jurisdiction by a
court exercising jurisdiction consistent with its provisions, the pro-
posed Hague Convention was in need of a checking mechanism at the
recognition stage. Article 27 of the proposed Draft Convention pro-
vides that the "court addressed shall verify the jurisdiction of the court
of origin. ' 39 This "verification" provides a means for the enforcing
35. The June 2001 Draft, Article 8, entitled "Individual Contracts of Employment," states that
the subject of employment contracts was not specifically discussed at Commission II, but that
working documents from earlier informal discussions are included in Annex II and --should be
viewed in the light of the Alternatives proposed in relation to Article 7 .... " Id. at art. 8.
36. See id. at arts. 7(1) and 7(2).
37. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
38. When the Brussels Convention was signed in 1968. the European Court of Justice did not
have the power to review jurisdictional issues. At that time. a joint declaration was adopted
committing the Contracting States to study the question of conferring jurisdiction on the Euro-
pean Court of Justice to interpret the Brussels Convention. In 1971. a protocol was adopted that
conferred upon the European Court of Justice jurisdiction to give ruling on the interpretations of
the Convention. See Brussels Convention. supra note 15, at art. 1. The Protocol does not extend
to decisions under the Lugano Convention. For the role of the European Court in this area, see
C.G.J. Morse. International Shoe v. Brussels and Lugano: Principles and Pitfalls in the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction. 28 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 999. 1009-10. 1020-25 (1995).
39. June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 27(2).
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court to determine for itself whether jurisdiction was properly exer-
cised under the provisions of the Convention; that second court will
be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its
jurisdiction (except in default judgments), but not the conclusions of
law.
Another important set of provisions, so far without significant con-
troversy, are those dealing with recognition and enforcement. The
structural aspects of enforcement and recognition appear to be
agreed-that is, Convention States would be required to recognize
and enforce judgments that rest on jurisdiction on the mandated list;4o
those predicated on a prohibited basis of jurisdiction would be denied
enforcement; 4t and judgments rendered on a basis of jurisdiction in
the gray area would not have to be recognized by other states, but
states would be free to recognize (or not) judgments in this category.42
Article 28 sets forth a set of discretionary defenses to recognition and
enforcement, including the defense of public policy.43 More surpris-
ingly, perhaps, is the acceptance (so far) by the United States of a
provision that permits an enforcing forum to re-examine the amount
of damages rendered in the initial action (read United States) to see if
comparable sums could have been awarded there. 44 It was precisely
this issue of re-examination of damages that had derailed efforts in the
1970s on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to
reach a bilateral agreement on recognition and enforcement; 45 but in
the context of a worldwide convention, a provision of this kind is
clearly more palatable.
40. "A judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction provided for in Articles 3 to 13. or which is
consistent with any such ground, shall be recognized or enforced under this Chapter." Id. at art.
25.
41. See id. at art. 26.
42. See id. at art. 24 (entitled "Judgments Excluded from Chapter III").
43. See id. supra note 4, at art. 28 (1)(f). The precise language says, "recognition or enforce-
ment would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the state addressed."
44. See id. at art. 33. As regards non-compensatory damages, such as exemplary or punitive
damages. recognition is mandatory only to the extent that similar or comparable damages could
have been awarded in the State addressed. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 33(1). A
debtor may also show that the damages awarded were "grossly excessive." and recognition may
be limited to a lesser amount: however, in such a case, the court addressed must recognize the
judgment in an amount no less than what could have been awarded in the State. See id. at art.
33(2).
45. See P.M. North, The Draft U.K/U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, I Nw. J.
IN'L L. & Bus. 219 (1979).
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II. THE TENSIONS AT THE HAGUE: EUROPEAN AND
U.S. APPROACHES COMPARED
The breakthrough to a "mixed convention" with a gray area of ju-
risdiction, a jurisdictional checking mechanism in the enforcement
court, and preliminary acceptance of a limited review of damages of-
fered a basis for optimism for a successful conclusion to the negotia-
tions at the Hague. Still, certain differences about the jurisdictional
provisions-both at the general level and at the level of specific de-
tail-remained. Many of those are reflected in the June 2001 Prelimi-
nary Draft.
On a theoretical plane, Americans and Europeans take fundamen-
tally different approaches to the issue of judicial jurisdiction (particu-
larly regarding those countries with civil law systems). First, the
Europeans aspire to a framework that discourages opportunities for
forum shopping at the transnational level. Brussels/Lugano is pre-
mised on the existence of a limited number of possible fora from
which a plaintiff may choose; a defendant can always be sued at its
domicile on any claim, 46 and the rules for "special" jurisdiction will
often point to a single forum. 47 For example, under Brussels/Lugano,
in matters relating to a contract, jurisdiction is only appropriate "in
the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in ques-
tion.' '48 By contrast, in the United States, jurisdictional schemes usu-
ally offer a variety of possible fora in contract actions. In the United
States, for example, a defendant would be subject to general jurisdic-
tion in any place where it had extensive activities ("doing business"
jurisdiction) and not just its place of incorporation/principal place of
business. Additionally, it would be amenable to specific jurisdiction in
a number of possible places-such as where the contract negotiations
occurred, where the contract was performed, and perhaps even where
the contract was entered into. Thus, one objective for the Europeans
at the Hague was to limit the possible fora in which suit could be
brought.
Secondly, civil law regimes have always had a preference for formal
rules as contrasted with discretion. And while concepts like "mini-
46. Domicile is the basis for general jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention. See Brussels
Convention. supra note t5, at art. 52. With respect to a corporation, Article 53 provides: "For
the purpose of this Convention, the seat of a company or other legal person or association of
natural or legal persons shall be treated as its domicile . Id. at art. 53.
47. See, e.g.. Morse, supra note 38. at 1005-06, 1024.
48. Brussels Convention, supra note 15. at art. 5(1). The Brussels Regulation. Article 5(l)(b)
further delineates the place of performance for contracts for goods and services. See Brussels
Regulation, supra note 10. at art. 5(1)(b).
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mum contacts" and "reasonableness" have consistently presented
problems for some U.S. critics of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tional jurisprudence, 49 the reaction abroad to these American devel-
opments has been far more negative.50 Another example of the
differences between Anglo-American and civil law conceptions can be
seen in the adaptation of English procedure that was required when
England joined the Brussels Convention. Domestic English rules for
service out of the jurisdiction require an application for leave, and a
variety of factors-including a showing by the plaintiff that there is a
good case on the merits-are usually considered in deciding whether
to grant such leave and ultimately whether to uphold it.51 However,
in keeping with the Brussels preference for rules rather than discre-
tion, no such leave is required if the case before the English court is
within the scope of the Brussels Convention. 52
Similarly, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which originated in
Scotland and has been long accepted by courts in England and the
United States, plays no role in the Brussels/Lugano Conventions. 53
Indeed, the European Court of Justice has held that forum non con-
veniens has no place in the English courts when jurisdiction is asserted
under the Brussels Convention. 54 Brussels/Lugano does contain lis
pendens provisions for simultaneous actions pending in different Con-
tracting States between the same parties and involving the same cause
of action 55 as well as for related actions. 56 However, the solution in
49. See Kevin M. Clermont. Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNEI i L.
REV. 89. n.1 (1999) ("[T]he American house of jurisdiction to adjudicate is not a place where any
sensible person other than a lawyer (if that is not redundant) wants to live.-) (quoting Stephen
B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Centurv or Beginning of the Millennium?. 7
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111. 123 (1999)): Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfitfor Globetrotting.
28 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1027 (1995).
50. See, e.g.. Morse. supra note 38.
51. See UK Rules 2000, supra note 18. at 6.21. See generally Seaconsar Far E. Ltd. v. Bank
Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran. [1993] 3 W.L.R. 756 (Eng. H.L.).
52. UK Rules 2000. supra note 18, at 6.19(1).
53. See generally Ronald A. Brand. Comparative lorutn Non Conveniens and the Hague Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and Judgments. 37 Tt x. IN-['[- L.J. 467 (2002).
54. Case C-288/92. Custom Made Commercial Ltd. v. Stawa Metallbau GmbH. 1994 E.C.R. I-
2913. See generally Dic EY & MORRIs, THE CONFi-i(-i OF L,,,s 392-93 (13th ed., Collins 2000).
55. Brussels Convention. supra note 15. at art. 21: Brussels Regulation. supra note 10. at art.
27. A strict -first seised" rule applies in this situation. For an interesting discussion of various
abuses that have occurred as a result of the strict lis pendens rule of Article 21 of Brussels/
Lugano. see Trevor C. Hartley, How to Abuse the Law and (Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-
Faith Proceedings Under the Brussels Jurisdiction atid Judgments Convention. in LAWN AND JUS
TICE IN A MULTIsTATE WORLD, supra note 3. at 73-81.
56. Brussels Convention. supra note 15. at art. 22 (revised slightly in Brussels Regulation.
supra note 10. at art, 28). In this situation, discretion is given to a court other than the court first
seised to decline jurisdiction. For a more extensive discussion of Articles 21 and 22 of Brussels/
Lugano as well as the new Brussels Regulation. see Stephen B. Burbank. Jurisdictional Equili-
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the former situation proceeds via a strict first-seised rule and only in
the latter context is discretion granted and then only to the court sec-
ond-seised. These philosophical differences about the proper balance
between rules and discretion help explain why the June 2001 Hague
Draft contains so many jurisdiction "alternatives, ' 57 as well as the rea-
son for the somewhat constrained forum non conveniens and lis
pendens provisions. 5s
Third, the constitutionalization of jurisdictional rules in the United
States via the Due Process Clause means that the debate at the Hague
is not only about different policy views. The rules of "required" juris-
diction adopted in a proposed convention cannot impair the due pro-
cess rights of the defendant as understood in the U.S. Supreme
Court's most recent jurisprudence. The difficulty arises because the
constitutional limits on judicial jurisdiction in the United States stress
the relationship between the individual defendant and the forum 59-
an inquiry quite different from the approach of civil law countries,
where the focus is on the relationship between the dispute and the
forum and usually carries no constitutional overlay. Thus, a classic
basis of jurisdiction over torts-that jurisdiction can be exercised by
the State where either the tortious act or injury occurs-is adopted by
the European Court of Justice in construing the Brussels Convention 60
and appears in various drafts of the proposed Hague Convention.
Such a provision, however, may not satisfy the required nexus with a
defendant as demanded by American constitutional jurisprudence.
Even the latest qualification in Article 10 of the June 2001 Draft,
which eliminates the place of injury when "the person alleged to be
responsible could not reasonably have foreseen that the act or omis-
sion could result in an injury of the same nature in that State, ' 61 may
fall short of U.S. constitutional requirements. 62 Similar constitutional
problems were presented by articles in earlier convention drafts au-
bration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 Ai. J. CoMp. L. 203
(2001).
57. See, e.g., June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 6. Alternatives A, B: see infra text accompa-
nying notes 73-80.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 139-152.
59. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court. 480 U.S. 102 (1987): World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286 (1986). See generally Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction
in a Multilateral Convention: The Lessons of the Due Process Clause and the Brussels Conven-
tion, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 125, 154-55 (1998).
60. See Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasses d'Alsace. 1976 E.C.R. 1735. See generally Di-
CEY & MORRIS, supra note 54, at 353.
61. June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 10(b).
62. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, "'mere foreseeability" on the part of the
defendant was held constitutionally inadequate. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-97.
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thorizing jurisdiction over multiple defendants if one defendant was
habitually resident in the forum,63 and over claims for indemnity or
contribution when there was jurisdiction over the principal claim.64
These provisions were deleted from the June 2001 Draft, and thus ex-
ercise of jurisdiction on one of these bases is now neither authorized
nor prohibited; rather, jurisdiction in such matters would now seem to
fall into the gray area, thus accommodating concerns expressed by the
United States. Similarly, as noted earlier, the specially designed rules
for contracts involving consumers (allowing a consumer to sue in the
forum of its habitual residence if the conclusion of the contract on
which the claim is based is related to trade or professional activities
that the defendant has engaged in or directed to that state) appear to
have accommodated potential U.S. constitutional limitations.65
Finally, strong disagreements over the propriety of general jurisdic-
tion-whether jurisdiction may be asserted over a defendant without
links to the specific transaction but with a more general connection to
the forum (apart from its place of residence)-threaten to derail the
Convention. 66 Most countries do not subject a defendant to jurisdic-
tion based on its general business activities, and when the United
States does so with respect to a foreign defendant, 67 it exacerbates
other systemic differences that are perceived as unfair by foreign
parties.
IV. THE JUNE 2001 DRAFT: CONSENSUS,
COMPROMISE, AND DISCORD
A. The Required Bases of Jurisdiction
If one first looks at the category of "required" jurisdiction-that is,
jurisdictional bases that are to be afforded by every Convention State
and judgments that are to be enforced if rendered on those grounds-
there is little that is controversial from the United States' perspective.
The grounds for general jurisdiction-[habitual] residence for an indi-
vidual and place of incorporation, statutory seat, principal place of
business, and central administration for juridical entities-seem ap-
propriate and consistent with U.S. law,68 even if the particular terms
63. See Oct. 1999 Draft. supra note 27. at art. 14.
64. See id. at art. 16.
65. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4. at art. 7.
66. See Silberman. Can the Hague Judgments Be Saved?. supra note 9.
67. For some of the difficulties of applying general jurisdiction to foreign defendants, see
Twitchell, supra note 23. at 197-201.
68. See June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 3.
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are not always completely familiar. 69 Both choice-of-forum clauses
conferring exclusive jurisdiction 70 and appearance by the defendant
other than for the purpose of challenging jurisdiction 7' are also gener-
ally compatible with U.S. law. And although it is agreed that "special
jurisdictional provisions," such as those for torts, contracts, and intel-
lectual property, should be included in the Convention, the alternative
formulations of many provisions in the June Draft evidence disagree-
ment not only about language but also about substance. 72 In addition,
throughout the negotiations there has been discussion about whether
jurisdiction should be identified by traditional substantive categories,
such as torts and contracts, or left to a more general, activity-based
formulation. 73 To take one particular example, Article 6, Alternative
B, of the June 2001 Draft contains what can be characterized as the
"European" alternative for the appropriate forum in contract cases.
In contract cases, the premise is that the proper forum is where the
contract is to be performed, and Alternative B in Article 6 identifies
the place of performance of the particular obligation: 74 the action may
69. Whether or not the term "habitual" will qualify residence remains undecided. Some dele-
gations were concerned that "habitual residence" had acquired too technical a meaning in the
interpretation of other Hague Conventions, particularly the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention.
See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, multilat-
eral, 19 I.L.M. 1501. For a discussion of the use of the concept in multilateral conventions, see
E.M. Clive. The Concept of Habitual Residence. 1997 JURID. REV. Part 3. See also Nygh &
Pocar, Report of the Special Commission. supra note 29. at 39.
70. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 4. A forum-selection clause is generally under-
stood by U.S. courts as non-exclusive, but there are good reasons to treat the forum choice as
exclusive. Thus, the proposed Hague rule has appeal for United States interests as well. See
Kevin M. Clermont & Kuo-Chang Huang, Converting the Draft Hague Treaty into Domestic
Jurisdiction Law, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDicrION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE
HAGUE 191-234, supra note 9. Article 4 in the June 2001 Draft contains several modifications
from the provision in the prior October 1999 Draft. An absolute prohibition on unilateral desig-
nations by plaintiffs was eliminated, and the issue of invalidity due to lack of consent or incapac-
ity is left to national law, including conflict of law rules. Alternative formulations of the rule are
found in Article 4(1) and 4(5) of the June 2001 Draft. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4. at art.
4(1). 4(5).
71. Id. at art. 5.
72. Id. at art. 6. Alternatives A, B: id. at art. 7, Alternatives A. B, & C: id. at art. 12, Alterna-
tives A, B.
73. See Peter Nygh, The Criteria for Judicial Jurisdiction, in NYU Conference, supra note 25,
at A-1-12: see also Nygh & Pocar, Report of the Special Commission. supra note 29, at 48-49:
Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of March 1998 on Inter-
national Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Pre-
liminary Doc. No. 9, at 31-32 (1998), available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm pd9.doc (last visited
Nov. 14. 2002).
74. See Nygh & Pocar, Report of the Special Commission. supra note 29, at 49. The Brussels
Convention. Article 5(1) originally contained the more general "place of performance of the
obligation in question" language for matters relating to contract, but the specific identification of
the place of performance for goods and services has been included in the new Brussels Regula-
tion. Brussels Regulation, supra note 10. at art. 5(1 )(b). For some of the difficulties presented
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be brought in the state in which the "goods were supplied in whole or
in part" 75 or where the "services were supplied in whole or in part. '76
As for contracts involving both goods and services, the required forum
is where the "performance of the principal obligation took place in
whole or in part.177 From the American viewpoint, this formulation
for a jurisdictional provision for contract cases is narrow and formalis-
tic. 78 Many kinds of contracts do not neatly fit the "contracts for
goods or services" parameters of the Article, and requiring courts to
ascertain whether the principal obligation concerns goods or ser-
vices-where contracts involve both-seems an unnecessarily grudg-
ing approach. The provisions in most U.S. state specific-act statutes
offer more flexible alternatives for jurisdictional rules involving con-
tracts. A standard formula for contract actions is to authorize suit in
the courts of a state where the defendant "transacts business in the
state" when the claim "arises from" that activity.7 9 The American ap-
proach in the Hague Draft of June 2001 is found in Alternative A to
Article 6, which allows an action when the defendant has conducted a
certain level of activity and the claim is based on a contract directly
related to that activity. 80
The tort provisions in Article 10, as noted above, have gone a long
way in trying to fit with U.S. constitutional requirements. To the ex-
tent the existing language of the June 2001 Hague Draft still falls
short, it would be appropriate to allow the United States (and any
other Contracting State) to take a reservation if a required ground of
jurisdiction would violate its own constitutional norms. It is also pos-
sible that the provisions of an international treaty could affect the U.S.
by the Brussels approach, see Patrick J. Borchers. Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United
States and the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. CoMP. L. 121.
140-41 (1992).
75. June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 6(a). Alternative B.
76. Id. at art. 6(b), Alternative B.
77. Id. at art. 6(c). Alternative B.
78. See Kovar Letter, supra note 4.
79. See RoIERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISOICTION IN Civii, ACTIONS 397-98
(3d ed. 1998): see also Clermont & Huang, supra note 70) (discussing the benefits of such a
provision).
80. The precise formulation, along with bracketed language, is as follows:
[A] plaintiff may bring an action in contract in the courts of the State -
a) in which the defendant has conducted frequent Jand][or] significant activity: [or
b) into which the defendant has directed frequent [and] [or] significant activity:]
provided that the claim is based on a contract directly related to that activity [and the
overall connection of the defendant to that State makes it reasonable that the defen-
dant be subject to suit in that State].
June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 6. Alternative A. Two variants elaborating the concept of
"activity" are offered as an additional paragraph (2) to Article 6.
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Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutional limits of due process
and permit the exercise of jurisdiction in these circumstances, at least
for cases falling within the Convention. 81 As with the contract provi-
sions, the issue of how to best formulate a "tort" provision on jurisdic-
tion remains. In addition to the basic provision for jurisdiction in the
courts where the "act or omission" occurred or where the injury, sub-
ject to foreseeability, arose, 2 there is a proposal to insert an activity-
based jurisdiction similar to that suggested in relation to contracts; it
appears in bracketed language as Article 10(2).83
One illustration of a compromise of American and European ap-
proaches is reflected in Article 10(4), which provides that if the action
is brought only on the basis that the injury arose in the State, the court
has jurisdiction only in respect to the injury that occurred there, unless
that State is the habitual residence of the injured party.84 The effect is
to provide a strong incentive for the plaintiff to sue in the place where
the tortious act occurred or where the defendant is located if the
plaintiff is not habitually a resident in the state where the injury
arose.8 5 Such a rule has some value in defamation-type cases to dis-
courage the American style forum shopping that often results when
the injury occurs in several states.86 On the other hand, the approach
of the European Court of Justice in interpreting the tort provision of
the Brussels Convention in a defamation case creates the likelihood of
a multiplicity of actions in different fora, even where a libel victim
with a reputation to lose will suffer most of the reputation harm at the
habitual residence. 87 The provision in the June 2001 Hague Draft of-
81. The point is not that the treaty would in any way "trump" the constitutional limitations
imposed on the exercise of jurisdiction. Rather, the fact that an international treaty and/or fed-
eral statute expressly asserted jurisdiction on particular grounds has a bearing on the evaluation
of constitutionality. See Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers" for International Shoe (And None for
Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 755.
762-67 (1995) [hereinafter Silberman, Two Cheers]; see also Walter W. Heiser. A "Minimum
Interest" Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (2000) (critiquing the
existing constitutional standard and offering a proposal that would bring the United States into
closer alignment with the jurisdictional rule in Europe).
82. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 10(t).
83. Id. at art. 10(2).
84. Id. at art. 10(4).
85. A "gray area" of permissive jurisdiction does still exist under the Convention, and a plain-
tiff can sue for the entire damage in the place of injury if permitted to do so under national law.
Enforcement of such a judgment, however, is not required by other Convention States. The
complexities arising from this situation are discussed in Ronald A. Brand, Current Problems,
Common Ground, and First Principles: Restructuring the Preliminary Draft Convention Test, in
A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE, supra note 9.
86. Cf Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
87. In Shevill v. Press Alliance. the European Court of Justice held that a plaintiff libeled by a
newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States could bring an action against the
[Vol. 52:319
2002] INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE JURISDICTION 335
fers an appropriate middle ground between Brussels/Lugano and the
generally accepted rule with respect to jurisdiction over libel actions
in the United States,88 although the desirability of such a rule in cases
other than defamation is unclear.89
A comparison of the October 1999 and June 2001 Drafts reveals a
different kind of compromise in yet another aspect of tort jurisdiction.
Under the October 1999 Draft, when the injury in the State was eco-
nomic and the action was based on an allegation of a violation of anti-
trust or competition law, the place of injury no longer served as a
required basis of jurisdiction. 90 Jurisdiction in such cases was not pro-
hibited,9' but plaintiffs in such actions did not gain the enforcement
benefits of the Convention. Moreover, plaintiffs in such actions would
be precluded from obtaining jurisdiction on any of the bases found on
the prohibited list. The first preference of the United States was to
have economic injuries treated in the same way as physical injuries,
with jurisdiction appropriate in the courts of the State where the in-
jury arose. With little support by other States for that position, how-
ever, the U.S. fall-back position was to eliminate competition-type
cases from the Convention altogether. Under the latter scenario, be-
cause antitrust and competition judgments would fall outside the Con-
vention, they would not be entitled to recognition and enforcement
elsewhere; at the same time, however, the Convention prohibitions on
jurisdiction would be inapplicable. The June 2001 Draft appears to
have accepted the second alternative and excluded antitrust and com-
petition claims from the Convention. 92
The complexities around electronic commerce were not initially
confronted in the early negotiations at the Hague, but delegates have
focused on e-commerce issues at informal meetings, and it is clear that
publisher in the place where the publisher was located and recover for all the damage suffered.
However, if the plaintiff sued in any of the Contracting States where the publication was distrib-
uted and the plaintiff suffered reputational injury. jurisdiction would be limited to recovery of
the harm suffered in that State. Case C-68/93. Shevill v. Press Alliance. 1995 E.C.R. 1-415.
88. 1 use the term "generally accepted rule" here because certain specific-act statutes provid-
ing for jurisdiction on the basis of an act or injury include an express exception for defamation
cases. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 302(a)(2), (a)(3) (2001).
89. The creation of multiple fora for the recovery of partial damages is likely to be inefficient
in other types of cases.
90. See Oct. 1999 Draft, supra note 27. at art. 10(2).
91. Antitrust and unfair competition actions brought in the State where the injury occurred
would be within the "gray list:" Convention States would be free to decide whether or not to
enforce the judgment.
92. See June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 1(2)(i). I say --appears" because the provision
appears in brackets. In addition, the provision in Article 11(2) of the October 1999 draft-which
provided that the place of injury was not an appropriate basis of jurisdiction when the injury was
"'caused by anti-trust violations"-is deleted in the June 2001 Draft. See id. at art. 10 n.66.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:319
e-commerce concerns and the impact of the Internet are significantly
affecting the negotiations. 93 How best to incorporate provisions with
respect to e-commerce into the Hague Convention remains unclear. 94
The June 2001 Draft reflects some recognition of the problem,95 but
93. See, e.g., Catherine Kessedjian, Electronic Data Interchange, Internet and Electronic Com-
merce (Apr. 2000), available at ftp://hcch.net/doc/gen-pd7e.doc (last visited Nov. 11. 2002) (sum-
marizing meetings organized by the Hague in Geneva in September 1999). See generally David
Goddard. Does the Internet Require New Norms?, in 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM Du DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 183 (2000). See also Avril D. Haines, The Impact of the Internet on the Judg-
ments Project: Thoughts for the Future (Feb. 2002). available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/
gen-pdl7e.doc (last visited Nov. 11. 2002). A recent international litigation involving Yahoo!.
Inc. has been widely reported in the press and has focused additional attention on these issues.
Yahoo!. Inc., the California internet portal and service provider, was sued in France by La Ligue
Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme (LICRA), a non-governmental organization based in
France dedicated to fighting racism and anti-semitism, and the French Union of Jewish Students
(UEJF). LICRA and UEJF alleged that Yahoo!'s auction site, which displayed and made availa-
ble for sale various Nazi memorabilia, violated certain provisions of the French Penal Code
making any such display or sale illegal. In May 2000. the French court found jurisdiction over
Yahoo! on the basis of the "wrong" in France. It issued an interim order prohibiting Yahoo!
from making its auction service displaying Nazi artifacts accessible in France. and it appointed
experts to determine the feasibility of certain compliance defenses asserted by Yahoo!. On No-
vember 20. 2000. the judge issued an Ordonnance de Refere. ordering Yahoo! to comply within
three months with the injunction issued earlier to "take all necessary measures to dissuade and
make impossible any access via Yahoo.corn to auction service for Nazi merchandise ... subject
to a penalty of FFr. 100.000 per day .... (English translation of French court order on file with
author). More particularly. Yahoo! was ordered to re-engineer its content servers in the United
States and elsewhere to enable them to recognize French Internet Protocol addresses and block
access to Nazi materials by end-users, and to require end-users with "ambiguous" IP addresses
to provide Yahoo! with a declaration of nationality when they arrive at Yahoo!'s home page or
when they initiate any search using the word -Nazi.- See Yahoo!. Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Yahoo! then brought an
action against LICRA and UEJF in the federal district court in California. seeking a declaration
that the French court orders issued against Yahoo! were not subject to recognition or enforce-
ment. The U.S. federal court granted summary judgment in favor of Yahoo!. holding that en-
forcement of the French order would be inconsistent with the values of the First Amendment.
Id. For more details on the Yahoo! case. see Mahasti Razavi & Thaima Samman, Yahoo! and
Limitations of the Global Village. 19 COMM. LAw. 27 (2001): Allan R. Stein. Frontiers of Jurisdic-
tion: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. Cii. LEGAL F. 373. 395-99 [hereinafter Stein,
Frontiers of Jurisdiction].
94. For example. the new Brussels Regulation in Articles 15(t)(c) and 16(1) did nothing more
than to authorize the consumer to sue in his home State when a defendant directs commercial or
professional activities to the domicile of the consumer and the contract falls within the scope of
such activities. See Brussels Regulation. supra note 10. at arts. 15(1)(e). 16(1). That is somewhat
surprising since the European Union has considered e-commerce issues more specifically in
other directives. See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic
Commerce. in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178). See generally Francois Dessemontet. The
European Approach to E-Commerce and Licensing. 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 59 (2000): Norel Ros-
ner, International Jurisdiction in E-Commerce Contracts. available at http://www.llrx.com/fea-
tures/euecom.htm (last visited Oct. 7. 2002).
95. For example. with respect to Alternative A of Article 6 for contracts based on activity
when the claim is based on a contract directly related to the activity, jurisdiction on such a basis
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many of the implications of e-commerce and the Internet-in areas
such as intellectual property, 96 defamation,97 and click-wrap agree-
ments in consumer contracts98-have yet to be fully aired. 99
B. The Prohibited Bases of Jurisdiction
The general concept of a category of exorbitant or prohibited juris-
diction meshes comfortably with U.S. law, which in its national law
has elevated an excess of jurisdictional authority to a violation of the
U.S. Constitution.100 Moreover, many of the particularized excesses
does not exist "where the defendant has taken reasonable steps to avoid entering into or per-
forming an obligation in that State." June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 6. Alternative A(3).
Footnote forty-one explains that the provision "seeks to protect business parties including those
using electronic commerce who take measures to avoid entering into obligations in a particular
State and thereby avoid becoming subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State." Similar
bracketed provisions can be found in Article 7 (relating to consumer contracts) and in Article 10
(tort provisions). Id. at arts. 7(3), 10(3).
96. Even apart from the e-commerce aspects, the debate over appropriate jurisdictional provi-
sions in intellectual property is completely open. Various proposals appear in Article 12 of the
June 2001 Draft, but there is no consensus that intellectual property should be included in the
Convention, or if it is, whether the tentative provisions for exclusive jurisdiction should apply to
both registered and unregistered marks. See June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 12. The im-
pact of the internet with respect to copyright and copyright infringement has added to the com-
plexity. See Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and the Prelirninary
Draft Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention. 62 U. PIri. L. REV. 581, 594-97. 602 (2001)
[hereinafter Brand. Preliminary Draft Convention].
97. The jurisdictional ramifications of defamation over the internet are not clear on the na-
tional level either. See, e.g.. Griffis v. Luban. 646 N.W.2d 527, 536-37 (Minn. 2002) (refusing to
enforce Alabama default judgment where jurisdiction in Alabama was asserted over a Minne-
sota resident on the basis of statements made on an Internet newsgroup). In Griffis. the Minne-
sota Supreme Court held that Alabama's assertion of jurisdiction in this context violated due
process: even though the defendant knew her statements could and were likely to be read in
Alabama where plaintiff's reputation would be impacted, the court found that Alabama was not
the "focal point" of the activity. See generally Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace. 32 INT'i, LAW. 1167. 1180-81 (1998) [hereinafter Stein. Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace]: Howard B. Stravitz, Personal .hrisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is Re-
quired on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925. 934-36 (1998).
98. For example, Article 7 in the June 2001 Draft, entitled "Contracts Concluded by Consum-
ers." effectively allows a consumer in an e-commerce transaction to sue the defendant in the
State in which the consumer purchases the goods. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4. at art. 7(1 ).
Article 7 also prevents a consumer from being sued in a place other than the habitual residence.
See id. at art. 7(4). Finally. Article 7 prevents the use of pre-dispute choice of forum clauses. See
id. at art. 7(3). However, several alternatives allowing more flexibility with respect to choice of
court clauses in consumer cases also appear in the June 2001 Draft. See supra text accompanying
notes 31-35.
99. See generally Brand. Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 96. at 581: Haines. supra
note 93.
100. As early as 1877. the Supreme Court held that the assertion of judicial jurisdic-
tion-whether exercised by state or federal courts-is subject to constitutional scrutiny under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pennover v. Neff. 95 U.S. 714 (1877):
see also Friedrich K. Juenger. American Jurisdiction: A Stor
' 
of Comparative Neglect. 65 U.
Cot o. L. REV. 1. 4-7 (1993) (condemning the constitutionalization of judicial jurisdiction).
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set forth in Article 18(2) of the June 2001 Draft, as well as in earlier
drafts, are uncontroversial from the perspective of the United
States.10 1 Jurisdiction based solely on the presence of the defendant's
property in the forum state; nationality, domicile, habitual or tempo-
rary residence or presence of the plaintiff; nationality, temporary resi-
dence or presence of the defendant, as well as service of writ upon the
defendant; unilateral designation of the forum by the plaintiff; and the
signing of a contract from which the dispute arises would fall within
(or come close to) the unconstitutional zone.102
But there is one aspect of the prohibited jurisdiction that remains
unacceptable from the American side and that is the inclusion of gen-
eral "doing business" jurisdiction in the exorbitant category. Article
18(2)(e), though now in brackets, still identifies as one of the prohib-
ited grounds of jurisdiction "[the carrying on of commercial or other
activities by the defendant in that State, [whether or not through a
branch, agency or other establishment of the defendant] except where
the dispute is directly related to those activities.] "103 The fact that all
of subsection (e) is now in brackets-unlike earlier drafts 0 4-suggests
that there may be some room for compromise.
From the start, the attempt to articulate an overall definition of pro-
hibited jurisdiction-resulting in Article 18(1) of the June 2001
Draft-has been difficult. Article 18(1), which contains language of
particular significance in brackets, provides: "Where the defendant is
habitually resident in a Contracting State, the application of a rule of
jurisdiction provided for under the national law of a Contracting State
is prohibited if there is no substantial connection between that State
and [either] the dispute [or the defendant]."'' 0 5 At the June negotia-
tions, some delegates wished to delete the entire paragraph,10 6 and
101. Paragraph (2) identifies particular examples of exorbitant jurisdiction. See June 2001
Draft, supra note 4, at art. 18(2). Paragraph (3) provides for an exception for some subset of
human rights cases. See id. at art. 18(3).
102. Service of a summons on the defendant due to temporary presence in the state-so-called
"tag" jurisdiction-was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Burnham v. Supe-
rior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). However, Burnham was a domestic U.S. case and
did not involve jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (published prior to Burnham) suggests that such transitory
presence is not an appropriate basis for jurisdiction under international law. See RESTATEMENT.
supra note 11, at § 421 cmt. e.
103. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 18(2)(e).
104. See, e.g., Oct. 1999 Draft, supra note 27, at art. 18(2)(e): June 1999 Draft, in NYU Con-
ference, supra note 25, at C-19-37.
105. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 18(1).
106. As explained in a footnote, the reason that some delegates wanted to delete the entire
paragraph was that they sought to "emphasise [sic] the basic concept ... that there be a limited
number of required bases of jurisdictions that are generally accepted," another group of "juris-
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others wanted to omit the words in brackets. If the brackets are re-
moved and the words in brackets remain, a national rule of jurisdic-
tion with a substantial connection to the defendant would fall within
the gray zone. Presumably, then, the "doing business" jurisdiction-
at least in some circumstances-would be permitted even if recogni-
tion of a judgment would not be required. However, if the bracketed
language comes out of Article 18(1), this substantial area of judicial
jurisdiction now permitted under American law-the "doing busi-
ness" jurisdiction-would be prohibited under the Convention.
Traditionally, courts in the United States have exercised jurisdiction
when a defendant conducts systematic and continuous activities within
the forum state, even when the claim is unrelated to the activity.10 7
Thus, when foreign enterprises have a permanent establishment in the
United States, jurisdiction is obtainable in the United States under
existing law even with respect to a claim that arises outside the United
States. 10 8 If the European option in the June 2001 Draft is adopted,
the United States would have to agree to abandon this type of general
jurisdiction against foreign defendants from Convention States,
whether or not enforcement abroad is ever sought. And it should be
noted that in many situations these multinational enterprises will have
assets in the United States, and foreign enforcement would not even
be necessary.
It is true, as the Nygh-Pocar Report explains, that "there is a signifi-
cant margin of uncertainty" as to when a general jurisdiction basis
such as "doing business" applies because of "the difficulty of deter-
mining the quality and quantity of activity which is needed in order to
found jurisdiction ... ."119 That problem also exists as a matter of
domestic American law because if defendants' activities in the forum
state are too attenuated, general "doing business" jurisdiction will be
found unconstitutional.t
dictional bases so universally disapproved as exorbitant that they should be listed as prohibited
... and that any other basis of "jurisdiction not listed in either category should remain open."
i.e.. in the "gray zone." June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 18(1) n.106.
107. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). See generally
Philip B. Kurland. The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdiction
of State Courts - From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review. 25 U. CHi. L. REV. 569. 577-86 (1958):
Juenger, supra note 23. For an interesting analysis of recent cases in which courts asserted gen-
eral jurisdiction. see Twitchell. supra note 23.
108. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l. Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1967). For a list of
cases between January 1995 and September 2000 where courts exercised general jurisdiction
over non-U.S. defendants, see Twitchell, supra note 23, at 190-93 n.81.
109. Nygh & Pocar. Report of the Special Commission. supra note 29, at 77.
110. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia. S.A. v. Hall. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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Many major multinational enterprises-such as Siemens, Phillips,
Daimler-Chrysler, and Novartis-have permanent establishments in
the United States. Notwithstanding that such companies have for-
mally incorporated and maintained their principal place of business
and legal headquarters outside of the United States, from the Ameri-
can point of view, they do have an established presence in the United
States. Particularly when American citizens or habitual residents are
injured-even with respect to a claim originating outside the United
States-there does not seem to be great unfairness in allowing the
resident plaintiff to sue such a defendant in plaintiff's home state. In
the Report of the American Law Institute on International Jurisdic-
tion and Judgments (for which I am co-Reporter along with Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld), the following example is used."' A habitual
resident of the United States, traveling in Europe, ingests a pharma-
ceutical manufactured by Novartis and has an adverse reaction. She
returns home to the United States and wishes to bring suit against the
manufacturer. Under U.S. law, she would have no difficulty maintain-
ing the action because the defendant has extensive business activities
in the United States; enforcement of a resulting judgment would be
relatively easy in the United States because the defendant would have
substantial assets in the United States. Thus, the law of the United
States treats foreign defendants who carry on extensive business activ-
ities in the United States as if they were an American-based company.
Such equivalence is not peculiar to American jurisprudence." 2 An
overseas company that carries on business within England is subject to
jurisdiction there even if the claim has no connection with the English
activity.' 13 For example, in South India Shipping Corp. Ltd. v. Export-
Import Bank of Korea,' 4 a foreign bank was held subject to suit in
England where it was found to have an "established place of business"
from which it conducted external relations with other banks and car-
ried out preliminary work. The Court of Appeals explained that to
exercise jurisdiction in such a case was to put such a foreign company
on the same footing as an English company in making it subject to
suit.
111. See American Law Institute. Report, International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project 14
(Apr. 14, 2000).
112. See Silberman, Comparative Dimension. supra note 17. at 404.
113. See DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 54, at 296-300.
114. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 585. 592 (C.A.): see also Saab v. Saudi Am. Bank, [1998] 1 W.L.R. 937
(Q.B.).
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Japan has a similar rule. In Goto v. Malaysian Airline System,' 15
suit was brought in Japan against Malaysian Airlines by the widow of
a Japanese resident who was traveling between points in Malaysia
when his plane crashed. The Japanese Supreme Court sustained juris-
diction on the basis of the defendant's branch office in Japan. Goto
involved an airline accident between points in Malaysia and, there-
fore, was outside the scope of the Warsaw Convention, the interna-
tional convention covering suits arising out of accidents in
international air carriage. Thus, the case was decided on the basis of
Japanese domestic law. It is interesting to note in this context that the
recent amendment to the Warsaw Convention would extend jurisdic-
tion to the State in which the passenger is a "principal and permanent
resident"-the so-called "fifth forum"' '1 6-if the "carrier operates ser-
vices for the carriage of passengers by air" in that State.'' 7
Thus, the position that an injured plaintiff should be entitled to
bring suit in the State of his or her place of residence when the defen-
dant carries on substantial activity in that State hardly seems extreme
or uniquely American,'8 albeit inconsistent with the scheme of the
Brussels/Lugano Conventions. For example, Brussels/Lugano rejects
jurisdiction based on the establishment of a branch office, unless the
dispute arose out of the operations of the branch.' 19 The argument
against jurisdiction rests on a desire both to achieve certainty and to
115. See, e.g.. Andreas F. Lowenfeld. Jurisdiction of Courts. in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 48-52 (Clarendon Press Oxford 1996) (discussing the
Goto case). See also Kenichiro Hayashida, .urisdictional and Applicable Law in Aviation Cases
in Japan, reprinted in 26 JAPAN ANN. INT'Li L. 122-24 (1983).
116. Other possible fora under the Warsaw Convention are the territory of a Contracting
State that is the domicile or principal place of business of the carrier, a place of business of the
carrier through which the contract has been made, or the place of destination. See Convention
of the Unification of Certain Rules Regarding International Transport with Additional Protocol.
Oct. 12, 1929. art. 28. 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
117. See Convention of the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air.
May 28. 1999. art. 33(2). ICAO Doc. No. 9740, available at http://www.aviation.go.th/airtrans/air
law/UnificationofCertainRules.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
118. For example. the recent revision of the Warsaw Convention (though not yet in force)
provides for jurisdiction in the State of the principal and permanent residence of the plaintiff if
the defendant air carrier operates services there. It has been suggested that the Goto case and
the Warsaw Convention situation are more compelling cases because defendants engage in the
same business in the plaintiff's home State as they do in their home State and the place where
the event occurred. If that turns out to be the basic objection to my proposal, it might be possi-
ble to limit the "'doing business" jurisdiction to those situations where the defendant's business
in the forum State bears some relationship to the defendant's business or activity that gives rise
to the claim. However, the claim should not have to "arise from" the defendant's activity in the
forum State.
119. See Brussels Convention, supra note 15. at art. 5(5): Brussels Regulation. supra note 10,
at art. 5(5).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:319
avoid forum shopping.1 20 In addition, given the availability of other
types of special or "specific" jurisdiction under Brussels/Lugano,121
the assertion is that another State has a more legitimate interest in the
dispute and is the more appropriate forum. 122 Finally, the absence of
any defined standard for "doing business" creates an impression that
the foreign defendant may in fact have a relatively attenuated rela-
tionship with the forum. 123
An appropriate compromise might be to allocate this category of
jurisdiction to the gray area. 124 Then States that continue to find such
jurisdiction objectionable would not have to enforce judgments that
120. In the context of foreign country defendants, the choice of a U.S. forum is also likely to
mean a more significant exposure, due to systemic differences such as juries, discovery, and
possibly even less favorable applicable law. See Twitchell. supra note 23, at 197-201 (explaining
the particular burdens that general jurisdiction places on foreign defendants).
121. General jurisdiction in the United States was developed when specific jurisdiction was
not yet fully available. It has thus been suggested that with the availability of specific jurisdic-
tion, only a few cases in which the United States has a legitimate interest in providing a forum
will be blocked. See Russell J. Weintraub. How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recog-
nition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?. 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167
(1998): Clermont and Huang, supra note 70.
122. See Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction, supra note 93. at 385-86.
The doctrine permits the forum state to set standards of care, assess responsibility, and
award damages in a matter in which it has no regulatory stake. While it may do so
under the guise of applying another state's law, the judge and jury are drawn from the
wrong political community. The forum is thus illegitimately appropriating the sover-
eign prerogative of another state.
Id. For a similar critique, see Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy. A Unifying Theor
, 
for
Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. Comp. L. 249 (1991).
123. Neither U.S. Supreme Court nor state case law has provided much guidance on this ques-
tion. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall. 466 U.S. 408 (1984), the Colombian
defendant (Helicol) purchased four million dollars worth of helicopters and equipment from a
Texas company and sent prospective pilots and other personnel to Texas for training. The chief
executive officer of Helicol went to Texas to negotiate a contract of transportation with a Peru-
vian consortium, the alter ego of a joint venture headquartered in Texas. Helicol received over
five million dollars in payments from the consortium drawn on a Texas bank. Four U.S. plain-
tiffs, whose decedents were killed in Peru as the result of the crash of a helicopter owned by the
defendant. Helicol. brought suit in Texas against the Columbian defendant. The Supreme Court
of the United States found these contacts constitutionally insufficient to establish general
jurisdiction.
Other lower courts have asserted general jurisdiction where the activities have seemed even
less substantial. See, e.g., Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Warrent Transp., Inc., 920 F. Supp.
722 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction based on defendant's
business activities with several forum companies): Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Motor Sport.
Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1386 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (finding defendant's purchases from a Wisconsin manu-
facturer and maintenance of distribution relationship sufficient for invoking general
jurisdiction).
Further attenuation occurs when general jurisdiction is based on the defendant's relationships
and arrangements with other entities, which are said to constitute its presence in the forum. For
a more extensive discussion of the "agency" cases, see Twitchell, supra note 23. at 188-90.
124. In response to prior Preliminary Hague Draft proposals. I have made this suggestion in
other papers. See Silberman. Can the Hague Judgments Projects Be Saved?. supra note 9. Some
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rest on general jurisdiction of that kind. At the same time, American
(or other) courts that are able to enforce judgments against foreign
defendants on the basis of forum assets will not have their own do-
mestic rules for jurisdiction curtailed. Another modification to Arti-
cle 18 that might appeal to both sides in the debate over general
jurisdiction would be to narrow the area of general "doing business"
jurisdiction on the prohibited list and permit general jurisdiction in
those situations where the argument for such jurisdiction is the strong-
est. Article 18 could be modified to prohibit jurisdiction on the basis
of the "carrying on of the commercial activity by the defendant when
the activity did not give rise to the claim except where the defendant
has a branch office or where the defendant's activity in the forum is
evidence of a substantial presence in the forum State, and the plaintiff is
habitually resident in that State."1 25
Cases in which foreign defendants have extensive and substantial
activities in the forum State represent the strongest claims for general
jurisdiction.' 2 6 The exception could follow the English rule, which ap-
pears to require an "established place of business;" alternatively, as I
suggest, it could embrace a more flexible standard that would still de-
mand that the activity in the forum State be "substantial and continu-
ous." Where the foreign defendant's relationship with the forum is
more attenuated, there is a less compelling claim for jurisdiction, and
jurisdiction in such cases would remain on the prohibited list. From
the European or "Brussels" perspective, this narrower area of prohib-
ited general jurisdiction should be acceptable. To the extent that a
broader category of general jurisdiction continues to be disfavored,
enforcement of judgments based on such jurisdiction would remain
within the prerogative of the enforcing forum. As a result, even if the
line between the black and gray zones of jurisdiction is less than crys-
move in this direction is reflected in the fact that Article 18(2)(e) appears in brackets in the June
2001 Draft. See June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 18(2)(e).
125. I have also offered this proposal before. See Silberman. Can the Hague Judgments
Projects Be Saved?, supra note 9. The proposal does not contain an express reference to subsidi-
ary corporations. but the activities of subsidiaries should be included here when the relationship
of the subsidiary is so closely linked to the multinational enterprise by common ownership and
control so as to be fairly regarded as a mere department or alter ego of the multinational enter-
prise. See Obligations of a Company Belonging to an International Group and Their Effect on
Other Companies of that Group, in 65-I ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTiTUT DE DROT" INIERNA-iONAL
191-326 (1993): Obligations of Multinational Enterprises and their Member Companies, in 66-11
ANNIJAIRE F L'INsTITUT DE DROit INTERNATIONAL 463-73 (1996). 1 have attracted some sup-
porters for this alternative. See Twitchell. supra note 23. at 210.
126. The argument is that such a foreign defendant's level of activity is like that of an "in-
sider." Cf. Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721
(1988). See also Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction. supra note 93, at 381-86.
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tal clear, the interest of other countries would be preserved to a lim-
ited degree at the enforcement stage.
The interests of the United States would also be protected by the
proposed modification to Article 18. Under the proposal, general
"doing business" jurisdiction would be permitted where the interests
of the United States are the strongest-cases brought by habitually
resident plaintiffs in a forum where the defendants have an extensive
presence. However, general jurisdiction would be prohibited in two
categories of cases where it now exists. One category involves plain-
tiffs not habitually resident in the United States; the other relates to a
possible increase in the level of commercial activity that would now be
required. As to the first, although it is true that formal jurisdiction
does not turn on the residency or domicile of the plaintiff, most cases
with a pattern of foreign plaintiff, foreign defendant and unrelated
cause of action would be likely to force dismissal on grounds of forum
non conveniens even if technical jurisdiction were sustained.1 27 Thus,
any change to existing U.S. law would be minimal. With respect to the
second category-the levcl of activity necessary for general jurisdic-
tion-the proposed modification may in fact accurately capture the
developing American jurisprudence in this area.1 28  The Supreme
Court itself, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,129
has imposed limits on the level of activity that will support general
jurisdiction.130 And in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,13 1
the Supreme Court superimposed a "reasonableness" standard on the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction with particular regard to foreign de-
fendants. 132 In thinking about the constitutional limitations on gen-
127. The federal courts and most states in the United States recognize the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. See generally GARY B. BORN. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATEs CouRs 298 (3d ed., Kluwer 1996).
128. There is some suggestion that the Supreme Court may view the "doing business" jurisdic-
tion as applicable only to corporations and not to individuals. In Burnham v. Superior Court of
California. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of -tag"
jurisdiction. Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by three other Justices, dropped the following foot-
note: "It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting 'continuous and systematic' con-
tacts, to support jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum applies
only to corporations, which have never fitted comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based prima-
rily upon 'de facto power over the defendant's person."' Id. at 610 n.1 (internal citations
omitted).
129. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
130. See Access Telecom. Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
general jurisdiction over Mexican company on the ground that activities of the foreign defendant
fell short of due-process requirements. but finding specific jurisdiction over the defendant on the
basis of claims that arose from defendant's Texas activity).
131. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
132. The "reasonableness" prong of the Asahi test has not been limited to foreign defendants.
See Silberman. Two Cheers, supra note 81. at 760: Stephen B. Burbank. Practice and Procedure:
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eral jurisdiction, 33 particularly with respect to foreign defendants, the
residency of the plaintiff is an important factor. The modification pro-
posed here for Article 18 is consistent with the kinds of limits on juris-
diction implicit in Asahi, but the proposed rule has the advantage of
offering a clearer and more definitive standard.
A compromise along similar lines has been offered to resolve an
impasse on another category of prohibited jurisdiction. The European
Union has consistently insisted on eliminating "tag" jurisdiction; for
most purposes the United States has been agreeable, but groups inter-
ested in pursuing litigation against war criminals, human rights viola-
tors, and Holocaust profiteers did not want to give up the possibility
of bringing suit in the United States, where "tag" jurisdiction might
offer the only opportunity. 134 That compromise, as it appears in the
June 2001 Draft, 135 although still in brackets, 36 would permit the as-
sertion of jurisdiction, founded only on personal service in the forum,
for an action claiming damages under national law based on conduct
that constitutes: (a) genocide, a crime against humanity or a war
crime; 137 or (b) a serious crime under international law, provided that
the State has exercised its criminal jurisdiction over that crime in ac-
cordance with an international treaty to which it is a party and the
claim is for damages arising from that crime. 38 Cases in this category
would fall within the gray zone of jurisdiction-permitted under na-
The World in Our Courts. 89 Micii. L. REV. 1456, 1468-71 (1991) (reviewing GARY B. BORN &
DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL Civii LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STAIES COURTS: COMMEN-
TARY AND MATERIALS (1989)).
133. See. e.g.. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Roberston-Ceco Corp.. 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir.
1996). where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Asahi -reasonableness stan-
dard"-developed in the context of a specific jurisdiction case-to a case of general jurisdiction.
One judge on the three-judge panel dissented, urging that the reasonableness inquiry be con-
fined to the specific jurisdiction context until instructed otherwise by the Supreme Court. Id. at
577. But the panel majority in Metropolitan used the -reasonableness- test to protect an Ameri-
can defendant from suit in a sister state: the claim for imposing a reasonableness standard is
considerably stronger in international litigation that involves a foreign country defendant.
134. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). cert. denied. 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
135. See June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 18(3). This exception in the June 2001 version is
narrower than the provision in the prior October 1999 Draft. which consisted of two variants,
one of which included violations of fundamental rights established under international law. For
a discussion of the October 1999 provision, see Nygh & Pocar. Report of the Special Commission.
supra note 29. at 80-81.
136. A footnote indicates that the entire section (the whole of proposed paragraph 3) "is
included in the text within square brackets to facilitate future discussion." June 2001 Draft,
supra note 4. at art. 18 n.124.
137. Language in brackets would tie the definition to that in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
138. In the June 2(X)l Draft, sub-paragraph (b) "only applies if the party seeking relief is
exposed to a risk of a denial of justice because proceedings in another State are not possible or
cannot reasonably be required." June 2001 Draft. supra note 4. at art. 18.
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tional law but not required to be recognized or enforced in other Con-
vention States. One difference between the human rights compromise
and the suggestion for a "doing business" compromise is that in the
human rights cases there is no requirement that the plaintiffs be habit-
ual residents of the forum State.
C. The Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens Provisions
The provisions on forum non conveniens and lis pendens, as re-
flected in the June 2001 Draft, 139 represent a middle ground between
the Anglo-American common law approach and that of Brussels/
Lugano. As Professor Stephen Burbank explained, it illustrates "en-
lightened comparative procedural lawmaking." 1411 Like earlier drafts,
the June 2001 Draft addresses both lis pendens141-that is, the possi-
bility of staying an action in deference to another previously com-
menced action-and declinations of jurisdiction (akin to forum non
conveniens).142
The basic controversy about declinations of jurisdictions-forum
non conveniens in Anglo-American parlance, which the civil law tradi-
tion generally rejects 43 and the common law world increasingly em-
braces-have not yet been completely resolved. The June 2001 Draft
includes-as did earlier drafts-a narrow provision for declining juris-
diction in "exceptional circumstances."'' 44 The Nygh-Pocar Report
makes clear that Article 22 of the Hague Draft is different than the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, and a forum may defer jurisdiction
only if the other court actually assumes jurisdiction. 145 Moreover, the
conditions for the exercise of this discretion are much stricter than
American concepts of forum non conveniens-in particular, the spe-
cific requirement that the initial forum be one that is clearly
inappropriate. 146
139. See June 2001 Draft. supra note 4, at art. 21 (addressing lis pendens) id. at art. 22 (ad-
dressing forum non conveniens).
140. Sec Burbank. supra note 56, at 203, 206.
141. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 21.
142. See id. at art. 22. This Article is entitled "Exceptional Circumstances for Declining
Jurisdiction."
143. See, e.g., Gerhard Walter & Rikke Dalsgaard. The Civil Law Approach, in TRANSNA-
TIONAL TORT LITIGATION: JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLEs 46-48 (Campbell McLachlan & Peter
Nygh eds.. Clarendon Press Oxford 1996).
144. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 22: see generally Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Note on the Question of "Forum non Conveniens." in Perspective of a
Double Convention on Judicial Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Decisions, Hague Conf.
Prelim. Doc. No. 3 (Apr. 1996).
145. See Nygh & Pocar, Report of the Special Commission, supra note 29. at 89.
146. Under Article 22. Paragraph 1. the court may suspend its proceedings if in that case "it is
clearly inappropriate for that court to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of another State has
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Apart from its more general application of forum non conveniens,
the United States has no formal lis pendens doctrine, either in domes-
tic or international litigation;1 47 by contrast, the Brussels Convention/
Regulation has a strict first-seised rule for the "same causes of action"
and gives discretion only to a court second-seised to stay proceedings
or to decline jurisdiction when related actions are brought in courts of
different Member States. 48 Like Brussels, the June 2001 Draft in-
cludes an article on lis pendens that applies to "proceedings based on
the same causes of action" and adopts in general a first-to-file (first-
seised) rule. 149 But lessons learned from Brussels have led to modifi-
cations in the Hague version: the first-seised rule does not apply to
actions requesting determinations of nonliability; t5 ° and a court sec-
ond-seised may proceed if the plaintiff has failed to pursue the action
or if the court has not rendered a decision within a reasonable time.' 5 1
In addition, the Hague is pendens rule departs from a rigid first-seised
rule and includes a limited discretion, authorizing the court first-seised
to decline to proceed if there is a more appropriate forum else-
where.1 52 Like the more general provision for "declining jurisdiction"
in Article 22, however, the circumstances for the exercise of that dis-
cretion must be "exceptional."
The Hague Draft provisions on lis pendens and declinations of juris-
diction-along with the inclusion of the gray area for assuming juris-
diction-have moved the proposed Convention away from the model
of Brussels/Lugano from which it originated. The discretion built into
the Hague is particularly appropriate given the wide disparity of po-
tential parties to this worldwide effort and the absence of any supra-
national tribunal to preside over its implementation. The Hague
jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute." June 2001 Draft. supra note
4. at art. 22. The Report of the Special Commission stresses that the fact that another forum may
be "'clearly more appropriate" does not necessarily mean that the forum seised is itself "clearly
inappropriate." See Nygh & Pocar, Report of the Special Commission. supra note 29. at 90.
147. See James George. Parallel Litigation. 51 BAYLOR L. Riv. 769 (1999): Burbank. supra
note 56. Domestically, there is a similar problem of redundancy as between the federal and state
courts in the United States. See Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court
Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problen. 75 NoTiRE
DAME L. REV. 1347 (2000).
148. For a comparison of the lispendens provisions in the Hague Convention with those of the
Brussels/Lugano Convention. see Burbank, supra note 56, at 219. See also James P. George,
International Parallel Litigation-A Survey of Current Conventions and Model Laws. 37 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 499. 510-14, 522-24 (2002).
149. See June 2001 Draft, supra note 4, at art. 21(1).
150. See id. at art. 21(6).
151. See id. at art. 21(3).
152. See id. at art. 21(7).
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Draft of these provisions reflects the blending of the quite different
regimes of its constituents.
D. Can a Worldwide Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and Judgments Succeed?
The difficulties that the negotiators at the Hague have faced are
largely the result of differences over appropriate jurisdictional reach,
even if one believes that "jurisdiction" is just a masquerade for other
criticisms about American litigation. Much has been learned from the
efforts at the Hague. The range of countries and cultural and legal
traditions make consensus on a wide range of required and prohibited
bases of jurisdiction unfeasible. To that end, a retreat to a less ambi-
tious convention should be welcomed. As this Article illustrates,
there are a limited number of jurisdictional provisions where an allo-
cation to either the required or prohibited list will engender little or
no controversy. To the extent that consensus of that kind emerges,
placement on the required or prohibited list is appropriate. However,
as to those grounds on which there has been substantial opposition to
a particular category of jurisdiction, that basis of jurisdiction should
move to the gray list. This would mean that a judgment rendered on
that ground would neither obligate enforcement in a Contracting
State nor prevent enforcement by such State. It would also allow
greater freedom by States to assert jurisdiction under their own do-
mestic law regimes. Such an approach is reflected in the Draft Con-
vention's "human rights" compromise and in several of the
alternatives dealing with choice of forum provisions in consumer and
individual employment contracts. The modifications with respect to
the general "doing business" jurisdiction proposed in this Article
would further enlarge the area of permitted jurisdiction under na-
tional law. Indeed, a successful conclusion for the Convention is most
likely if Convention States are accorded broad flexibility to develop
their own jurisdictional regimes. Such an approach would also allow
jurisdictional rules with respect to e-commerce 153 and intellectual
property15 4 to develop over time and would have the advantage of not
restricting jurisdictional developments in these areas by creating an
overly expansive list of prohibited jurisdiction.
153. For some of the difficulties presented by e-commerce and the internet, see Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215. For
the impact of e-commerce on the Hague Judgments Project, see Haines. supra note 93. See also
Stein, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 97: Stein. Frontiers of Jurisdiction. supra note 93, at
389-99.
154. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss. An Alert to the Intellectual Property Bar: The Hague
Judgments Convention, 2001 U. I. L. RFv. 421.
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Even a limited convention would offer a foundation on which to
build greater consensus about jurisdictional rules for transnational
cases and international enforcement of judgments. The framework
would then exist for a summary and expeditious international enforce-
ment mechanism for cases grounded on a few "consensus" bases of
jurisdiction. If foreign enforcement appeared to be necessary, lawyers
would gravitate toward using one of the Convention's accepted bases
of jurisdiction. Lawyers could still bring suit using other bases of juris-
diction (as long as they were outside the prohibited list), but if they
did so they would take their chances on having that judgment en-
forced elsewhere. The Convention could go even further by authoriz-
ing States to declare certain bases of gray area jurisdiction that would
support judgments that their courts would regard as entitled to recog-
nition. Such a provision would offer flexibility for maximizing recog-
nition and enforcement between particular countries that share
similar legal cultures and traditions with respect to jurisdictional re-
gimes, and such declarations would create greater certainty with re-
spect to enforcement and recognition.
A brief last word. Should the negotiations at the Hague derail,
most will regard the Hague efforts as a great failure. Certainly, there
will be disappointment all around with respect to the time, money,
and energy spent and no formal product to show for it. But one
should not lose sight of the important lessons that have been learned
from the experience and the insights gained in attempting to under-
stand the wide gap that separates common law and civil law ap-
proaches to these issues. 155 Even a convention with quite limited
parameters is a first step and is one worth striving for.
155. To cite one example. the efforts at the Hague have focused attention on the issue of
recognition and enforcement of judgments and have stimulated the interest of the American
Law Institute. The International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project of the ALl. which was initi-
ated with a view to drafting proposed federal legislation to implement a successfully concluded
Hague Conventon, has turned its attention to drafting a federal statute on recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments in case the Hague negotiations fail. See American Law Inst..
International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project: Discussion Draft (Mar. 29. 2002). For more on
the ALl Project. see Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld. The IlagueiJudgment Conven-
tion-And Perhaps Beyond, in LAW AND JUsrIcE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD. supra note 3. at
121-35: Silberman & Lowenfeld. A Different Challenge. supra note 11. at 645-47.
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